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KIERKEGAARD'S CHRISTIAN IMPERATIVE
Patrick Goold

This paper describes a strategy for defending some of the core claims of Christianity from
evidentialist critics. The strategy is neither epistemological nor based on considerations
of 'proper basicality'. Indeed, this strategy, if successful, shows Christian faith to be not
merely permissible but ethically obligatory. It does so by taking seriously the claim that
faith is a virtue (in the classical sense) and that a reflecting conscience will discover this.
The paper also hopes to contribute to Kierkegaard scholarship by offering a new interpretation both of Sickness Unto Death and, by implication, of Kierkegaard's general significance for philosophy of religion.

Bernard Williams writes in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, "the issues
about religious ethics are issues about the human impulses that expressed themselves in it, and they should be faced in those terms." He continues, "for those
who do not believe in a religious ethics, there is some evasion in continuing to
argue about its structure: it distracts attention from the significant question of
what such outlooks tell us about humanity. "I Now the first assertion is one with
which Kierkegaard would fully agree. All of his writings, and especially Sickness
Unto Death, the book I wish to discuss in this paper, take as their starting point
human impulses of this sort and make explaining these impulses their final
desideratum. Kierkegaard and Williams differ, however, in their conclusions,
Williams thinking that this line of inquiry moves "in a direction that will destroy
religion,"2 Kierkegaard that it reveals the practical necessity of having faith.
Sickness Unto Death is, as I read it, about the structure of religious ethics in a
broad sense, and its final conclusion is that faith and human virtue are not
dissociable. Since it starts from the acknowledged fact that certain human feelings
and impulses frequently are manifest, Kierkegaard's argument is no distraction,
nor can it simply be ignored by the unbeliever. For these reasons I have thought
it worth looking at. What follows is an attempt to make the argument I find in
Sickness Unto Death3 explicit and to justify it as a reading of Kierkegaard.
I

The main body of SUD begins:
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what
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is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the
relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation
but is the relation's relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis
of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom
and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between
two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self.
This paragraph contains five significant predications about the self:
A) Spirit is the self.
B) The self is a relation that relates itself to itself.
C) The self is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation.
D) The self is not the relation but the relation's relating itself to itself.
E) The self is a synthesis
i) of the infinite and the finite.
ii) of the eternal and the temporal,
iii) of possibility and necessity.
Later in the same short section the following is asserted:
F) The self is a derived, established relation that relates itself to itself and in
relating itself to itself relates itself to another.
The opening paragraph does not say that the self is a synthesis, but that "a
human being is a synthesis." It follows however, that (1) since human being is
spirit and spirit is the self, human being involves being a self, and hence (2)
being a self, like being human, involves a synthesis. This inference highlights
two problems for any interpretation of the passage quoted. First, the sense given
to 'is' in these passages appears to vary, being sometimes the 'is' of identity
and sometimes the 'is' of predication. How does one sort out which is which?
Secondly, Anti-Climacus makes varying and apparently inconsistent use of the
definite and indefinite articles. For example, 'spirit' gets no article at all, while
'self' takes 'the' throughout until the last sentence, where one finds reference
to 'a self'. The problem: although it seems natural to infer that being human
involves being a self as in I above, considered as a synthesis, "a human being
is still not a self." One is forced to conclude that there is some important difference
between the self and a self. Saying what this difference is must wait, however.
A more important obstacle to understanding the quoted passage is the apparent
contradiction between Band F, on the one hand, and C and D, on the other.
The key to understanding the sentence in which B, C, and D appear as components
is understanding in what sense the 'or' that connects Band C is meant. There
are at least three possibilities: 'or' might indicate exclusive disjunction, inclusive
disjunction, or, as it sometimes does in colloquial English, apposition. D is
consistent with the first possibility. On this view Anti-Climacus could be read
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as making a disjunction-elimination argument: either B or C; not B; therefore,
C. While this reconciles B, C, and 0, however, it falters on F, which contains
both disjuncts. The second possibility would make both the relation and the
relation's relating spoken of in the quoted passage things Anti-Climacus would
call a self.
cannot be reconciled with this possibility. This leaves the third
possibility, which seems the best reading to me. On this view the 'or' is being
used as it is in the sentence "Metal rusts, or oxidizes, more quickly in salt water
than in fresh." It is shorthand for 'better yet,' 'to say the same thing more
clearly,' or 'more strictly,' and the fifth full sentence of the paragraph could be
paraphrased as follows:

°

While it is logically correct, and a convenient shorthand, to say that
the self is a relation that relates itself to itself, it would be better to say
that it is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; that is to
say, strictly speaking the self never is the relation, but rather the relation's
relating itself to itself.
This interpretation reconciles B, C, and F and fits nicely with much else in the
exposition of Anti-Climacus. The B-formulation is used many places in SUD,
and a successful interpretation must legitimize this. Considered strictly from a
logical point of view, it is perhaps correct to say that the relation is the self.
But humanly speaking, the self is acquired in time, and must be re-acquired in
every succeeding moment. Hence, this relation never simply is, but is always
coming to be. (See, for example, SUD, p. 17.) It is less misleading, therefore,
to put the emphasis on the action of self-relation.
A third problem with B, C, and F is their apparent circularity. They seem to
presuppose the very thing they set out to explain. For example, if "a self is a
relation that relates itself to itself' is a definition of selfhood, the definiendum
appears illicitly in the definiens. The solution to this difficulty has two parts.
The first is the notion of the self as a positive unity, rather than a merely
negative one, i.e. the notion of the self as a willing. This notion is introduced
in the second paragraph of the first part of SUD. 'Negative unity' here means
'a unity that is the result of an act of negation.' In the philosophical vocabulary
of the 19th Century any sort of change is a negation. A carpenter, for example,
negates a piece of wood in making it into a desk. In acquiring the new determinations of deskhood, it ceases to be what it was, a simple piece of wood.
Anti-Climacus presents the synthesis of body and soul as an example of a negative
unity. Here soul, pure immateriality, and pure matter join, and in the process
change (are negated), to yield the unity that is a living body. The original terms
disappear in the new unity, and for this reason it is called negative. A positive
unity, on the other hand, is brought about by a third thing standing outside the
other two terms of the relation. It brings these terms into relation while remaining
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unchanged itself. The terms themselves are not altered, their relation being one
more akin to juxtaposition than intermixture. In the case of the self, this third
thing that does the relating is the will, the relation of the terms is an act of will,
i.e. it is posited, and hence their unity is posit-ive.
The second part of the solution draws on the fact that the will can be reflected
upon itself. By this I mean primarily that in addition to immediate desires, it is
possible to have desires about desires, as when someone watching his weight
wants a dish of ice cream and at the same time wants not to want that ice cream.
Butler noted this and made it an important part of his ethics:
Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and
propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity
of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object
to our thought; and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve
some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of
good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. 4
Following Butler, I style this capacity for reflection 'conscience.'
If the notions of positive unity and of conscience are allowed, then the problem
of B's circularity is solved in the following way: the integral human self is
analyzed into two constituent selves and each 'self' in the definiendum of B
refers to a different thing than does the one in the definiens. Let us call the list
of all 'instincts and propensions' that move a person directly, whether they be
occurrent or dispositional, that person's actual self. And let us call the set of
those propensions such that upon reflection a person would conclude that he
ought to have them that person's ideal self. And finally, let us call the integral
self that results when a person's actual self and his ideal self are held in a positive
unity that person's spiritual self. B can then be paraphrased into these terms as
follows:
B*) The spiritual self is a relation that relates an actual self to an ideal self.
Since each of the senses of 'self' picks out a different thing, the problem of
circularity is solved. 5
The notion of the self as synthesis introduced in Proposition E above expands
this description of integral selfhood and its components. It specifies more closely
what sort of relation it is that is referred to in B*, and it gives significant labels
to the two relata.
The relation of actual to ideal self is, says Anti-Climacus, a synthesis (Synthese). In general, a synthesis is any relation between two or more items in which
the items stand combined in a new unity. There are, however, both negative
and positive unities. It is the point of the second paragraph of SUD l.A.a to
limit the relation between the two categories of self to syntheses producing a
positive unity. This limitation serves sharply to distinguish self-synthesis of the
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Anti-Climacean kind from the process of mediation (Vermittlung) that Hegel
takes to be the origin of selfhood. In the negative unity of Hegelian mediation
both elements lose their original identity. Moreover, this union is eventually (at
the stage of Absolute Knowing) a happy one, wherein the elements find both
rest and their fulfillment. The positive unity, as I pointed out above, is a willed
unity, and hence extrinsic to the structure of the two relata. The synthesis that
yields a positive unity appears to be far more a juxtapositioning of elements,
than their melding. Finally, this juxtapositioning seems intrinsically unable to
find a point of rest and fulfillment. This follows from the nature of the relata.
Anti-Climacus gives three sets of names to the elements of the self. This does
not mean that there are six items involved in three distinct syntheses wherever
there is a spiritual self, but only that the relata may be viewed from three different
aspects. (1) Finitude/infinitude is a distinction with regards to limits. One's actual
self is limited by the who, what, when, where of the physical world. Sex and
stature, for example, are boundaries of selfhood in this sense. One's ideal self,
on the other hand, is limited only by the power of one's imagination. 6 It is, in
practical terms, infinite. Furthermore, to the extent that one takes the source of
the obligatory desires that make up the ideal self to be God, this self will be
infinite in the sense of being 'of the infinite.' (2) Necessity/possibility is the
same dichotomy seen from the inside. 7 One's actual self is shaped at least in
part by one's animal nature. To the extent that one actually has a desire, to that
extent one is driven by the inner necessity of its natural laws. The ideal self, on
the other hand, is never simply attained. It is always a goal to be striven after,
and if, per impossibile, it should be attained, it must be re-acquired in the next
moment. Hence, it is never more than a possibility. This I take to be the meaning
of Anti-Climacus' difficult remark about the self, "Insofar as it has the task of
becoming itself, it is a possibility." (SUD, p. 35) (3) Temporality/eternality is
a distinction with regard to durability. The mark of the temporal is changeability,
and the actual self is obviously constantly changing. The desires to which one
feels obligated, the ideal self, however, is (or ought to be) eternal. First, in the
sense that one thinks of its oughtness independently of any concrete situation,
and secondly, in the sense of being 'of the eternal' to the extent that one takes
its contents to be specified by God.
The above points to the strongly normative character of Anti-Climacus' account
of the ideal self. The function of the ideal is to provide a norm, but one could
conceive of the actual content of the ideal as open to considerable variation,
both within groups of different people and within the same person at different
times. It even seems likely that in the movement of scouting one's inventory of
actual desires and in making decisions about changing it, one would see new
and hitherto uncontemplated possibilities for an ideal. A connoisseur of wines,
for example, struggling to put together the ideal cellar, might discover yet better
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vintages in his search to find the ones on his shopping list. His ideal, then, has
changed. In a higher sense, however, Anti-Climacus wants to make the ideal of
human selfhood independent of particular persons. There is a single ideal self,
he argues that is ideal for all and to which all men are obligated to conform,
even if all men do not in fact have it consciously before them as an ideal.
The acquisition of this ideal is a process. For the sake of being able to describe
the stages in this process Anti-Climacus will want to speak of, in addition to
simple failures at synthesis, 'spiritual selves' that are such by synthesizing an
actual self with a deficient ideal. One must make a distinction, therefore, not
only between actual and ideal selves, but also between one's actual ideal self
and the ideal (or genuine) ideal. With this distinction in mind, the question of
how to interpret the strange use of 'the self' and to distinguish it from 'a self'
can be answered. Failure to be a self (one self among many) is a failure to
synthesize one's actual self with any ideal self whatsoever. To perform the
synthesis (but with a deficient ideal), and in this way to attain a deficient ideal,
is to become a self. The self (the one and only self of its sort), on the other
hand, is acquired by synthesis with the genuine ideal.
Now conscience is the faculty by means of which one discovers the deficiency
of one's ideal and moves toward a more adequate one. 8 In the next section the
operation of this faculty is more closely described.
II

It is self-deception and weakness of will that keep an individual from seeing the
ideal ideal and making it his or her object. If the conscience is to direct one

toward the genuine ideal, it will have to perform at least two functions: self-clarification and restoration of the will.
"It is imperative to have clarity about oneself ... " (SUD, p. 47) The only
path to clarity of this sort is critical reflection on the ideal self. This is the
cognitive element of conscience. What is in effect an excellent description of
this element of conscience is found in Ortega's History as a System: 9
Man invents for himself a program of life, a static form of being, that
gives a satisfactory answer to the difficulties posed for him by circumstance. He essays this form of life, attempts to realize this imaginary
character he has resolved to be. He embarks on the essay full of illusions
and prosecutes the experiment with thoroughness. This means that he
comes to believe deeply that this character is his real being. But meanwhile the experience has made apparent the shortcomings and limitations
of the said program of life. It does not solve all the difficulties, and it
creates new ones of its own. When first seen it was full face, with the
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light shining upon it: hence the illusions, the enthusiasm, the delights
believed in store. With the back view its inadequacy is straightaway
revealed. Man thinks out another program of life. But his second program
is drawn up in the light, not only of circumstance, but also of the first.
One aims at avoiding in the new project the drawbacks of the old. In
the second, therefore, the first is still active; it is preserved in order to
be avoided. Inexorably man shrinks from being what he was. On the
second project of being, the second thorough experiment, there follows
a third, forged in the light of the second and the first, and so on.

I quote this at length because I believe it describes precisely the sort of work
the intellectual side of conscience does for Anti-Climacus, and describes it more
clearly and forcefully than he manages to do. Still, it is discernible in the SUD
account. For one thing, the principle is propounded that "the ever increasing
intensity of despair depends upon the degree of consciousness or is proportionate
to its increase ... " (SUD, p. 42) Since objectively everyone who is not a
Christian in the deepest spiritual sense is, for Anti-Climacus, in despair, to be
subjectively more intensely in despair is to have a truer appreciation of one's
real situation. And at least one part of the increase in consciousness is the product
of reflection upon the value of one's ideal, or in other words, is the product of
the cognitive element of conscience. One gains greater awareness of the reasons
one holds the ideal one does, and of the extent to which this ideal is internally
consistent. Hence, the animating principle behind Anti-Climacus' "progress in
despair" is just the sort of critical reflection described by Ortega.
Secondly, the language in which Anti-Climacus frames his descriptions of
each new transition has the same strong flavor of the experimental that Ortega's
does. The spiritless man, for example, copes with despair by giving up his
project of pure immediacy for the reflected immediacy of the crowd, and he
does this on the basis of certain refractory experiences. Says Anti-Climacus: "He
now acquires a little understanding of life, he learns to copy others, how they
manage their lives-and he now proceeds to live the same way." (SUD, p. 52)
If the despairer is more reflective, the experimental-critical features of his
reasoning are yet more pronounced:
with the aid of the reflection that he has, he attempts to sustain his self,
and this constitutes another difference from the purely immediate man.
He perceives that abandoning the self is a transaction, and thus he does
not become apoplectic when the blow falls, as the immediate person
does; reflection helps him to understand that there is much he can lose
without losing the self. He makes concessions; he is able to do so--and
why? Because to a certain degree he has separated his self from externalities, because he has a dim idea that there may even be something
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eternal in the self. (SUD, pp. 54-5)
And so it goes. The section of SUD entitled "Despair over the earthly or over
something earthly" is very rich in its descriptions of these 'coping-strategies.'
In this cycle of reflection and adaptation one moves from unconscious to conscious
despair, from wishing to be someone else to wishing to be no self at all, and
then to letting externalities define oneself. Eventually one leaves behind these
forms of despair over particular worldly projects and enters the stage of despair
"over the earthly in toto." At each stage clarity about oneself is gained.
To understand how it is that conscience can overcome weakness of will it is
necessary to recall the other factor in despair, namely to recall that "there is
indeed in all darkness and ignorance a dialectical interplay between knowing
and willing." (SUD, p. 48) The stress has been on the reflective and experimental
side so far, but this is untrue to the dialectical nature of the process. Actually
changes in the strength of one's resolve (one's passion, as Kierkegaard would
call it) occur pari passu with reflective changes in viewpoint. Moreover, it is
not only that the passion finds a new object, which is true but obvious, but that
it becomes more intense. to This is especially clear in the description of the move
to despair over the earthly in toto: "When the self in imagination despairs with
infinite passion over something of this world, its infinite passion changes this
particular thing, this something, into the world in toto . .. " (SUD, p. 60) To
reach this point one's passion must be infinite. Why? Because if one's project
meant less to one, then one would simply abandon it for another.
But how does one get into such a state? Anti-Climacus is silent on this point,
but Ortega once again has an explanation that fits in nicely with the Anti-Climacean account. He writes: II
I cannot now "be Hermione's lover." But why? The point is this, that
being a man of years I have already had time to be the lover of Cidalisa
and the lover of Arsinoe and the lover Glykeia, and I know now what
"being a lover" is. I know its excellences, I know also its limitations.
In short, I have experienced to the full that form of life that is called
"loving a woman," and, frankly, I have had enough. And so it happens
that the "cause" of my not being a lover tomorrow is precisely the fact
that I have been one. If I had not been a lover, if I had not already
experienced love to the full, I should be Hermione's lover.
Here, then, is a new dimension in this strange reality of life. Before
us lie the diverse possibilities of being, but behind us lies what we have
been. And what we have been acts negatively on what we can be.
Ortega does not reach despair over the earthly in toto; he "has had enough" of
being a lover and has moved on to another project. But what if he had persisted?
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What if he had passionately chosen the erotic, decided to define himself above
all in terms of "being a lover"? Then, presumably, having failed with Cidalisa,
it would be even more important to him to succeed with the next. But he finds
it impossible to "be a lover" to Arsinoe, and then to Glykeia. All the while he
fails to be a self and confronts evidence that his project is impossible for him
(namely, each successive failure). If he does not abandon it at this point, then
the importance he will attach to success with Hermione is even greater than that
he attached to success with any of the others. And so it would go, until as "a
man of years" he would conclude that he has "experienced love to the full" and
that other projects call him. Or until he would reach a stage at which nothing
in the world is more important than being the lover of a particular woman,
because this woman would represent for him the last chance of realizing his
ideal, and hence, his last chance of becoming a self. If he chooses the former
way, his consciousness, his passion, and his despair would be augmented, because
there would be contained within his new project the past experience of failure,
revealing that the dangers are greater and the prospects of success smaller than
he had hitherto hoped. If he chooses the latter, then his passion would be infinite
and his despair-over the earthly in toto.
One might object that such unbounded concern is unhealthy. And in a way it
is-but not because of its unboundedness. If Anti-Climacus is right that concern
for personal integration should outweigh all others (or as he would say, should
be infinite), then the despairer's passion is correct as to intensity, althoughfiawed
as to its object. Moreover, the despairer discovers this because he pushes the
project with total passion and does not decide that frankly he has had enough.
Consequently, he is now in a position to move on to a project that is truer rather
than merely different.
To summarize: the spiritual selfhood described by Anti-Climacus, the constant
striving to bring one's actual self into harmony with the ideal ideal, can only be
brought about by conscientious reflection. Reflection of this sort has two tasks.
The first is to expose failures of the actual self to conform to one's passion, and
failures of one's passion to conform to the ideal ideal. The second is to intensify
this passion to the point of absolute earnestness, the necessary condition of faith
and the natural outcome of conscientious reflection.
III

Anti-Climacus identifies this ideal ideal with God, or as he sometimes calls God,
"the constituting power." There are at least three justifications for this identification. All depend on the premise that in time conscientious reflection will inspire
an absolute earnestness in the individual, together with the corresponding need
for a fitting ideal for such earnestness.
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First of all, an individual must see the ideal ideal as objective, or as a power
outside himself or herself, and such a power is naturally thought of as divine.
Anti-Climacus argues for this in the beginning of his discussion of defiance
(SUD, p. 69). It follows from the concept of an ideal ideal that it must be capable
of consuming all of one's interest and of being pursued with absolute earnestness.
It must, so to speak, be a large enough vessel to hold an infinite interest. Now
the stoic, as Anti-Climacus calls him, tries to constitute his ideal ideal entirely
out of the infinity of his own imagination and without reference to the infinite
self that is the constituting power. In his ataraxia, his imperturbability, his
self-command, the stoic denies his "natural capacities, predispositions, etc. in
the specific concretion of relations" and to deny these is to deny the reality of
the power that established them. Making the self absolutely its own master,
however, has a fatal failing: "it is easy to see that this absolute ruler is a king
without a country actually ruling over nothing; his position, his sovereignty, is
subordinate to the dialectic that rebellion is legitimate at any moment." (SUD,
p. 69) Having made itself entirely what it is, the stoic self (as far as it can tell)
is always free to make itself into something else. "At any time it can quite
arbitrarily start all over again, and no matter how long one idea is pursued, the
entire action is within a hypothesis." (Ibid.) But a hypothesis is precisely the
sort of thing that is not pursued with absolute earnestness. The stoic, like the
waiter in Being and Nothingness can not be what he is, he can only play at being
it, and stoicism cannot, anymore than waiterhood, serve as the ideal ideal. The
transcendent reference point that would take the whole project out of the hypothetical, that would make it a large enough vessel for an absolute earnestness is
missing. The ideal ideal must lie in the infinite, for only an infinite object could
properly command an absolute earnestness, but in the infinite nature of the
constituting power, rather than the infinity of imagination.
The 'king without a country' passage quoted above suggests a second argument
for identifying the ideal ideal with God. If there is an ideal ideal it must have
absolute authority over the individual. But it is plausible to think, in a cosmic
application of the Lockean theory of property, that God and only God has absolute
authority over God's creatures. From this it would follow that the ideal ideal
and God are one. 12
Thirdly, of the stoics "simulated earnestness" Anti-Climacus says, "Like Prometheus stealing fire from the gods, this is stealing from God the thought-which
is earnestness-that God pays attention to one; instead, the self in despair is
satisfied with paying attention to itself." (SUD, p. 68) Much later he emphasized
this theme: "A cattleman who (if this were possible) is a self directly before his
cattle is a very low self, and, similarly, a master who is a self directly before
his slaves is actually no self-for in both cases a criterion is lacking." (SUD,
p. 79) The key concepts here are "paying attention to one" and being "directly
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before" someone. "The criterion for the self is always: that directly before which
it is a self . .. " (SUD, p. 79. My emphasis) The point of the example of a
cattleman must be something like this: if one made it one's ideal to be a cattleman
and took his cattle as the measure of that ideal (say, in terms of their contentment,
or milk production), then he would only need to be a self during certain hours
of the day and certain days of the week. He might even hire someone else to
do this for him-the paradigm of minimum selfhood, I would think. Such an
ideal could not be the ideal ideal once again because it would not be adequate
as an object of absolute earnestness. Such an earnestness must feel itself searched
by its ideal at every moment and in every place. To the extent that the ideal self
makes a lesser demand the spiritual self is diminished, because the synthesis of
actual and ideal selves that is the spiritual self becomes an intermittent thing.
The ideal so construed is an inadequate object for an absolute earnestness because
it is something it is possible to escape. An earnestness that is absolute feels such
no such possibility. An omniscient judge-God-is required. I3
IV

The preceding section described several justifications for the claim that conscience
demands that the individual make God his standard when judging the successfulness of his efforts to be a spiritual self. Anti-Climacus goes further, however.
To be genuine spiritual self is to be free from despair, but in the typology of
despair presented in SUD, there are several reflective attitudes that involve God
as criterion but that nevertheless remain despairing. The man he calls "the
passively defiant despairer" sees himself as an objection to God, as positive
evidence that an omnipotent and omni-benevolent deity cannot exist. As AntiClimacus puts it: "not even in defiance or defiantly does it [the self that constitutes
itself in this manner] want to tear itself loose from the power that established
it, but for spite wants to force itself upon it, to obtrude defiantly upon it, want
to adhere to it out of malice .... " (SUD, p. 73) This because "a spiteful
denunciation must above all take care to adhere to what it denounces." (Ibid.)
The passively defiant despairer takes God as his measure, for he is that which
proves that a just God does not exist.
At a higher stage there is "what could be called a poet-existence verging on
the religious, an existence that has something in common with the despair of
resignation, except that the concept of God is present." (SUD, p. 77) There is
also Socrates: "Let us never forget that Socrates' ignorance was a kind of fear
and worship of God." (SUD, p. 99) Finally, there is the despairer who despairs
over his sins. Rather than relating himself "transparently" to the constituting
power and in faith overcoming his sin, he makes it, or tries to make it, "internally
consi~:tent." (SUD, p. 109) His sin "closes itself up within itself ... and protects
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itself against every attack or pursuit by the good .
. " (Ibid.) He in effect
makes God his measure because he makes God the source of his sin.
Conscience cannot be satisfied with any of these standpoints, however, because
the god-relationship in each case is merely negatively defined, and moreover, it
is a prop to self-deception rather than an aid to self-clarification.
The concept of God has been fancifully used as an ingredient in human
importance, in becoming self-important directly before God. Just as one
becomes self-important in politics by belonging to the opposition and
eventually comes to prefer to have an administration just to have something to oppose, so also there is eventually a reluctance to do away with
God-just to become even more self-important by being in the opposition. (SUD, p. 115)
The penetration of this self-deception by means of conscientious reflection means
an intensification of passion and self-knowledge that redefines the individual's
god-relationship. "At this point, the intensification of consciousness of self is
the knowledge of Christ, a self directly before Christ." (SUD, p. 113) Christianity,
and Christianity alone, Anti-Climacus maintains, does away with the possibility
of, and the need for, blaming God for one's sins after the manner of the despairer
who despairs over sin, because "now God offers reconciliation in the forgiveness
of sin." (SUD, p. 114)
To justify this "Christianity and Christianity alone" is impossible in the space
of an article, perhaps in the space of a book, but I will briefly indicate what I
take to be Anti-Climacus' main thrust here. First, the claim of uniqueness is, I
think, an empirical claim. The necessary core of Christianity is, for Anti-Climacus
the revelation of the God-man, and the promise of forgiveness. These ideas are
too paradoxical ever to have occurred to the human imagination ("such a thought
never occurred to any man" SUD, p. 125) and God brought them into history
at one time and in one place. The second claim, that Christianity, if it were true,
would offer a solid resting point for conscientious reflection is more interesting.
If Anti-Climacus is right that conscientious reflection leads us inevitably to God
as our ideal ideal, then conscience leads us inevitably to unhappiness unless we
have some means of knowing precisely what this ideal would have us be, and
unless we have some reason to think that it is an ideal possible of attainment.
In the absence of special access to God, the former would be open to us only
if God became man and proclaimed God's ideality in human form. Since attaining
divinity is not a humanly attainable goal, the ideal ideal can be seen as a possible
goal for human beings only if God is seen as offering to make up the difference,
to blink the shortfall, in short to offer forgiveness. But this means Christianity.
Conscience drives the individual to take God as her standard, conscience likewise
drives her to think this standard attainable, conscience drives the individual up
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against it, saying 'This, or unbearable despair.' 14 This is the sort of reasoning
that] take to underlie Anti-Climacus' claim: "Only in Christ is it true that God
is man's goal and criterion." (SUD, p. 114)

v
To conclude: Anti-Climacus makes spiritual selfhood the essential function of
truly human existence. It would not be farfetched, I think, to think of him as
holding this quasi-Aristotelian principle: the highest good for an individual human
being is to be a spiritual self (as spiritual selfhood was described in the beginning
of this paper) to the fullest degree. Moreover, transmuting this Aristotelian idiom
into talk of obligations, it is clear that he believes one to be ethically obligated
to attempt to attain one's highest good. Section III showed how, on AntiClimacus' account, true spiritual selfhood is possible only if the individual takes
God as her ideal. From these three propositions it follows that one is ethically
obligated to take God as one's standard. The conclusion of section IV was that
only through faith in Christ can one make God one's standard. Since it is true
in general that if some action A is obligatory for some person, and doing A
implies doing some other action B, then B is also obligatory for that person, it
follows from the previous two statements taken together that one is ethically
obligated to have faith in Christ.
This argument is necessarily sketchy. The conclusions of sections III and IV
are especially in need of further justification, and in a way Kierkegaard's entire
authorship is directed at these points. I have only hinted at the ways he defends
them. My interest in this paper has been to indicate a conception of how one
arrives at faith and a strategy by means of which its claims might be defended
that is very different from both the epistemological and the purely logical (for
example, "Can God be both omnipotent and omniscient?") preoccupations that
distract many philosophers of religion. I am content to indicate a line of inquiry
I think will prove fruitful. If a strategy similar to that of Anti-Climacus can be
worked out in detail, the role of divine-command meta-ethics, of reflection and
emotion, of forgiveness and revelation, in Christian ethics will be made much
clearer. All by taking seriously the claim that faith is a virtue and that it is known
by the reflecting conscience to be so.
Northern Arizona University
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NOTES
I. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 33.
2. Ibid.
3. Hereafter referred to as SUD. Page numbers refer to those in the edition edited and translated
by Howard and Edna Hong and published by Princeton University Press in 1980.
4. Joseph Butler, "Of the Nature of Virtue," reprinted in British Moralists, ed. L. S. Selby-Bigge
(Dover: New York, 1965), p. 245. See also Ingmar Porn, "On the Dialectic of the Soul: An Essay
on Kierkegaard," Acta Philosophica Fennica 32 (1981): 198-210. Porn treats the same notion in
terms taken from computer science. The example of the wine buyer used above is his.
5. Although B" is clearer than B, one need not assume that Anti-Climacus was muddled about
what he was trying to say. Phrased the way it is, his insight has an unsettling effect upon the reader
that might well be more edifying than the same insight laid out in full explicitness. The more compact
formulation would then be precisely the one called for in a work intended "for upbuilding and
awakening."
6. This is a statement about what one can do, not what one ought to do. It might be unethical to
adopt an ideal such that it is far beyond one's power to realize it. But as long as one is talking about
actual ideals, it is obvious that people can, and often do, give themselves impossible ones.
7. I realize that the pair Anti -Climacus presents here is "freedom and necessity" but this must be
a slip on his part. When he expands on this topic later (pp. 35-42) it is phrased as possibility/necessity
throughout.
8. This is a special sort of conflict of conscience-in the fight to harmonize the actual self and the
ideal the despairer sees (though obscurely) that his ideal is very possibly beyond his powers of
realization. It depends too much on the unpredictable actions of another person and upon too many
chance events, something that could not be the case for a true ideal. His conflict, therefore, is not
so much between actual and ideal as between actual ideal and ideal ideal.
9. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "History As a System" in History as a System and Other Essays, trans.
Helen Weyl (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 215.
10. Passion and will are for Anti-Climacus' purposes synonymous. When Kierkegaard and his
pseudonyms speak of passion they are almost always speaking of this as the indication of a choice
of ideal self: "Let no one misinterpret all my talk about pathos and passion to mean that I intend to
sanction every uncircumcised immediacy, every unshaven passion," Kierkegaard writes in the Journals and Papers, 7 vols., ed. and trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP,
1967-78), #3127. By this he would rule out anger, joy, jealousy, pride, etc.-in short, the things
one would commonly call passions, but that he would call sentiments. See in this regard Journals
3125. To be overcome by the sexual appetite is to be subject to a type of sentimentality, but to
choose the erotic self as an ideal, as Don Juan does, is to possess erotic passion. Sentimentality is
entirely a case of 'being affected'. It is a mark of the physical constitution. The object of passion,
however, is chosen as much as encountered, and in the passion the will reveals itself.
11. Oltega, ibid., 207-8.
12. To recognize God's demands as a legitimate expression of Her authority is what I take AntiClimacus to mean when he talks about that state in which "the self rests transparently in the power
which established it." (SUD, p. 14)
13. It might be thought that the Kantian moral law might satisfy an absolute earnestness, but this,
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thougb not entertained by Anti-Climacus, was decisively, and I think rightly, rejected by Kierkegaard.
See Journals 188.
14. "In this manner God certainly becomes a postulate, but not in the otiose manner in which this
word is commonly understood. It becomes clear rather that the only way in which an existing
individual comes into relation with God, is when the dialectical contradiction brings his passion to
the point of despair and helps him to embrace God with the 'category of despair' (faith). Then the
postulate is so far from being arbitrary that it is precisely a life-necessity. It is then not so much
that God is a postulate, as that the existing individual's postulation of God is a necessity." Kierkegaard,
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton UP, 1941), 179fn.
15. Clearly the term 'ethical' has been given a new meaning from what it had in Fear and Trembling.
Anti -Climacus might well have called his book Beyond Sin and Virtue. See Anti -Climacus' contrasting
of the pair of concepts sin/faith with that of sin/virtue at SUD p. 124. The parallel with Nietzsche's
distinction of good/bad from good/evil is striking. Kierkegaard actually uses the phrase "beyond sin
and virtue" in Journals 1218: "sin's forgiveness belongs to the pure God-relationship, far beyond
sin-and virtue."

